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I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1974, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has experimented
with various emissions trading policies through its clean air program.' These
policies have established markets in which polluters trade emissions reduction
credits. The aim has been to allow polluters greater flexibility in choosing how
to control pollution, so as to reduce overall costs of pollution abatement.2
Scholars have reviewed the performance of these policies and credited them
with cost savings to industry in the hundreds of millions of dollars.3 Despite
these savings, analysts have noted many flaws in these experimental systems,
which they claim have led to a reluctance on the part of polluters to use the
1. Until now, EPA's "controlled trading options" have included "netting," "bubbling," "offsets," and
"banking." "Netting" permits a polluter to avoid the review process mandated whenever a plant expands
or modifies to such an extent that it expects to increase its emissions in excess of a specified amount. The
polluter must reduce emissions from another source within the same plant so that the net increase in
plantwide emissions remains below the specified level. See T. TIE ENBERG, EMIssIONs TRADING: AN
EXERCISE IN REFORMING POLLUTION POLICY 8 (1985); Hahn & Hester, Where Did All the Markets Go?
An Analysis of EPA's Emissions Trading Program, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 109, 132-33 (1989). Netting accounts
for the greatest percentage of trading activity to date. Id. at 133. The more liberal "bubbling" policy permits
sources to purchase emission reduction credits (ERC's, the currency of emissions trading, are earned by
reducing emissions below level prescribed by regulations. 51 Fed. Reg. 43,832 (1986)) from other regulated
sources, regardless of whether the sources are within the same plant, or owned or operated by the same
party. See T. TIErENBERG, supra, at 8; Hahn & Hester, supra, at 123. "Offsets" allow new or expanding
sources to locate in nonattainment areas (areas which exceed government standards limiting the local
concentration of a given pollutant), despite the mandate that these areas meet ambient air quality standards
"as expeditiously as possible." The new or altered sources must acquire a greater number of ERCs than
their expected emissions, so that total emissions in the area will decrease when these sources begin
operation. See T. TIErENBERG, supra, at 7-8; Hahn & Hester, supra, at 119. "Banking" allows sources to
store their ERC's for later use or trading. See T. TIETENBERG, supra, at 8-9; Hahn & Hester, supra, at 129-
30.
2. See, e.g., T. TIETENBERG, supra note 1, at 7-12; Dudek & Palmisano, Emissions Trading: Why is
this Thoroughbred Hobbled?, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 217, 218 (1988); Hahn, Economic Prescriptions for
Environmental Problems: How the Patient Followed the Doctor's Orders, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 95, 103 (1989);
Hahn & Hester, supra note 1, at 109. EPA also cites this reason as the motivation to use economic
incentives. Clean Air Act Reauthorization: Hearings on H.R. 3030 Before the Subcomm. on Energy and
Power of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 17-19 (1989) [hereinafter
House Hearings pt. 2] (testimony of William K. Reilly, Administrator, EPA) (These hearings focus on an
earlier draft of the Amendment, but the cited portions are equally relevant to the enacted Amendment.).
3. See, e.g., T. TIETENBERG, supra note 1, at 52-56,58; Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming Environmental
Law: The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171, 185 (1988); Dudek &
Palmisano, supra note 2, at 233-34 Hahn, supra note 2, at 100-0 1; Hahn & Hester, supra note 1, at 124-28.
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available markets. Critics insist that were EPA to eliminate these flaws, a
more efficient market and even greater cost savings would result.'
Title IV of the 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act6 (hereinafter "the
Amendment") offers one attempt to improve upon EPA's existing trading
schemes.7 This Amendment, an alternative to a proposal first introduced in
Congress by President Bush in 1989,8 aims to reduce acid deposition by estab-
lishing a market system to trade sulfur dioxide (SO 2) allowances.9 The polluters
receive emission allowances which they are free to trade among themselves.10
In theory, the operation of an allowance market system is straightforward.
If it were more expensive for polluter A to eliminate ten tons of emissions than
for polluter B to eliminate ten tons over and above its required reductions, then
4. Hahn & Hester, supra note 1 (thoroughly discussing problems and successes of EPA's controlled
trading options); see also T. TITENBERG, supra note 1, at 9-12; Hahn, supra note 2, at 97-103; Portnoy,
Reforming EnvironmentalRegulation: Three Modest Proposals, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 201,207-08 (1988);
Tripp & Dudek, Institutional Guidelines for Designing Successful Transferable Rights Programs, 6 YALE
J. ON REG. 369 (1989); Note, Transplanting Emissions Trading to Interstate Areas: Will It Take Root?, 5
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 312-16 (1987) (authored by Stephen Winslow).
5. "[Tlhe general failure of active markets in emission reduction credits to develop is the greatest
disappointment of emissions trading." Hahn & Hester, supra note 1, at 151. See also T. TIETENBERG, supra
note 1, at 188-215; Hahn, supra note 2, at 101; Hahn & Hester, supra note 1, at 115-18, 122, 151-53;
Roberts, Some Problems of Implementing Marketable Pollution Rights Schemes: The Case of the Clean Air
Act, in REFORM OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 93, 102 (W. Magat ed. 1982); Tripp & Dudek, supra
note 4, at 374-77, 385-86; Note, supra note 4, at 312-16. See generally Hahn & Hester, supra note 1; Hahn
& Noll, Barriers to Implementing Tradeable Air Pollution Permits: Problems of Regulatory Interactions,
1 YALE J. ON REG. 63 (1983).
6. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399. Due to a drafting error, the
1990 Amendments add a second Title IV to the Clean Air Act. This should change in the future.
7. The Amendment's scheme replaces a command and control system that reied heavily on "best
available control technology" (BACT) standards. These standards require polluters to reduce overall
emissions as much as is technically and economically feasible. Arguably, however, technology forcing is
a foolish way to regulate. First, setting and meeting command and control regulations for SO2 is costly and
complex; as a result, regulators often take no action at all. Second, it is not necessarily optimal to reduce
pollution by the greatest amount possible, no matter what the cost to society. The goal is to clean the air,
not to promote the use of certain technology. The positive social benefits of an astronomically costly
reduction in emissions might be minimal. Market schemes allow society to choose which risks are
acceptable. However, environmental risks are frequently unknown, while costs are not. Thus, abandoning
a commitment to the extreme position reflected in technology-forcing makes it easier for industry to slide
Congress down the slippery slope of subjective cost-benefit analyses. A market scheme only reduces overall
emissions of the regulated pollutant by the amount politicians have chosen, which hopefully correlates to
the amount required to protect human health.
8. H.R. 3030, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 135 CONG. REC. H4450-51 (1989); S. 1490, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.,
135 CONG. REC. S9934 (1989).
9. The burning of fossil fuels releases sulfur and nitrogen. These elements combine with oxygen and
moisture to create sulfuric and nitric acids. The acids form dry particles or mix with rain, snow, fog, or frost
to form acid deposition. The wind often transports these acids and deposits them hundreds of miles away.
Greenpeace Action, Acid Rain Pamphlet (available from Greenpeace Action, Washington, D.C.); S. REP.
No. 228, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 261-64 (1989) [hereinafter SENATE REPORTI (This report discusses an earlier
draft of the Amendment, but the cited portions are equally relevant to the enacted Amendment.)
10. Many critics of marketable permit schemes have expressed concern that giving allowances to
polluters vests in them a property right to pollute. In fact, the Amendment temporarily permits polluters
to emit limited quantities of pollutants, and explicitly states that an "allowance does not constitute a property
right" Pub. L. 101-549, sec. 401, § 403(f), 104 Stat. 2399, 2584-2631 (1990) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 765lb(f)) [hereinafter the provisions of section 401 of the Clean Air Act Amendments Bill of 1990 will




it would be less expensive for all parties in the aggregate if the government
were to permit A to meet its reduction requirements by paying B to reduce its
emissions of the regulated pollutant by an additional 10 tons. The same reduc-
tion in emissions would be achieved (twenty tons), but in the most cost-effec-
tive manner and at a cost savings to both A and B. Obviously, it would be an
administrative nightmare for the government to determine the most efficient
reduction schedule for each polluter. A trading scheme uses the market to
identify the polluters whose abatement costs are lowest and to motivate them
to undertake most of these reductions."
This Note evaluates the market system established by Title IV. Part II
briefly summarizes the Amendment. Part III explores possible exchange meth-
ods (i.e., how the allowances are to change hands). It demonstrates that a
periodic auction exchange method would produce a more efficient and equitable
trading system than the one adopted. Part IV speculates on how well the
adopted system will function. This Note aims to show that but for opposing
political pressure, Congress would have chosen a less complicated, more
equitable exchange method. The Note concludes that the Amendment neverthe-
less provides this country with an excellent market system with which to
combat acid deposition.
II. A SUMMARY OF THE AMENDMENT
A. General Structure
The Amendment regulates "affected sources"' 2 in three stages so the SO 2
reductions may be achieved progressively. Affected sources begin Phase I
reductions by January 1, 1995 and Phase II reductions by January 1, 2000.1
They must maintain the final reductions, scheduled for 2010, indefinitely. 4
The Administrator will allocate allowances to affected sources.'- Each
emissions allowance authorizes its holder to emit one ton of SO 2 "during or
11. For an explanation of why market mechanisms work efficiently, see T. TIETENBERG, supra note
I, at 15-16 (managers of regulated sources know each individual abatement cost function and, therefore,
know how much each source should be willing to pay in order to pollute given amount). Extensive literature
exists debating the appeal of market regulatory schemes. See, e.g., Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 3, at
171; Hahn & Noll, Designing a Market for Tradeable Emissions Permits, in REFORM OF ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION 119, 120 n.2 (W. Magat ed. 1982); Latin, Ideal Versus RealRegulatory Efficiency: Implemen-
tation of Uniform Standards and "Fine-Tuning" Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267 (1985);
Stewart, Controlling Environmental Risks Through Economic Incentives, 13 CoLUM. J. ENVTL. L 153
(1988); Tripp & Dudek, supra note 4, at 369 n.3.
12. For the purposes of the Amendment, all compulsory affected sources are fossil fuel-fired electrical
utility units, run on either coal, gas, or oil. See § 405(a) in conjunction with §§ 402(15), (17). Other sources
may elect to be designated affected under section 410. The terms "sources" and "polluters" are used
interchangeably as shorthand for the owners or operators of affected sources.
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after a specified calendar year," 6 and no affected source may emit SO 2 with-
out possessing an allowance that permits the emission. 17 Once the Adminis-
trator has promulgated the necessary regulations, the polluter is free to use its
allowances or to trade them with any of the "designated representatives of the
owners or operators of affected sources under this title and any other person
who holds such allowances .... ,,t8
All regulated sources must operate a continuous emission monitoring system
(CEMS),19 which will "provide on a continuous basis a permanent record of
emissions and flow"'2 of SO 2 and other pertinent materials. The Administrator
is to promulgate requirements for CEMS's, as well as for alternative systems
that provide requisite data where a CEMS is not feasible.1
In order to execute a trade, the Administrator must record "written certifica-
tion of the transfer, signed by a responsible official of each party to the trans-
fer; ... [a]l allowance allocations and transfers shall, upon recordation by the
Administrator, be deemed a part of each unit's permit requirements ... without
any further permit review and revision."' EPA will verify that the seller has
sufficient allowances to make the trade, and will cross-check the information
from the CEMS to insure that the seller's emissions level correlates with its
reduced allowance total.23
B. Allocating the Allowances
Establishing a tradeable rights system requires a determination both of the
number of allowances in the system and of the proper recipients. These factors
determine the level of pollution reduction the market hopes to attain, the
number and diversity of future traders, and the system's political appeal.
1. Regulated Sources and the Number of Allowances
Phase I traders consist of the owners or operators of the electric utility
plants listed in Table A of section 404 (the largest and dirtiest of the electric
utilities) or their designated representatives.24 Phase II regulates every electric
utility plant in the country except those less than twenty-five megawattage
(MWe) in size. The number and diversity of the regulated sources is important
16. § 402(3).






22. §§ 403(b), (d).
23. House Hearingspt. 2, supra note 2, at 17-19 (testimony of William K. Reilly, Administrator, EPA);
id. at 237, 239-40 (testimony of William G. Rosenberg, Assistant Administrator for Air and Radiation, EPA).
24. §§ 404(a)(1), (b).
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because there must be an adequate supply of buyers and sellers for the market
to function. Drafters of the Amendment believe that the pool of traders should
be sufficient to support an active market.25
Phases I and II call for gradual reductions in the pool of available allow-
ances. After 2009, the Amendment sets a permanent limitation on the total
amount of SO 2 emissions permitted each year. This ceiling is commonly
referred to as the "emissions cap."' 26 The emissions cap is the Amendment's
most important feature. It ensures that after the year 2009 there will be an
unyielding ceiling of 8.9 million allowances per year (not counting allowances
issued to opt-in sources or those banked from previous years).27 Consequently,
if greater productivity is demanded after 2009, sources will have to operate in
a cleaner and more efficient manner in order to contain their emissions within
the limits imposed by this cap. Section 403(a)(1) explicitly states that if neces-
sary to meet the 8.9 million ton cap, "the Administrator shall reduce, pro rata,
the basic Phase II allowance allocations for each unit... ." This crucial feature
of the Amendment insures that despite all of the government subsidies and
incentives, the emissions cap will be respected.
2. Distributing the Allowances
Determining how many allowances to disburse seems relatively simple
compared to deciding how to divide them among the polluters. Since there is
a cap on the total number of allowances, the more given to one source, the
25. The sizes and kinds of regulated electric utility plants vary. The mix of control options available
to such a wide range of participants seems certain to provide diverse abatement cost functions. Telephone
interview with Joe Goffman, former Associate Counsel to the Committee on Environment and Public Works
of the U.S. Senate. (Mr. Goffman was instrumental in drafting the Amendment and guiding it through the
legislative process. Presently, he serves as Consultant to the Office of Atmospheric Programs at EPA, where
he is helping to write the regulations necessary to implement the Amendment.)
26. § 403(a). While science plays a prominent role in determining the amount of SO2 emissions this
country can absorb without damaging the environment, our present knowledge is imprecise and leaves ample
room for both factual and political debate. See Clean Air Act Amendments of1989: Hearings on Acid Rain
Before the Subcomm. on Environmental Protection of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works,
101st Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 6, at 3-4 (1989) (statement of William Rosenberg, Assistant Administrator, Air
and Radiation, EPA) (These hearings focus on an earlier draft of the Amendment, but the cited portions
are equally relevant to the enacted Amendment.).
27. Technically, the cap is not set at 8.9 million. First, section 405(a)(3) provides a fixed number of
extra allowances to specified plants. Since the additional number of allowances is inflexible, it does not
violate the theory of the emissions cap; it simply raises the number slightly. This Note will ignore this
inconsistency.
Second, the Bill containing the Amendment sets a limit of 5.6 million tons per year on SO2 production
by industrial sources (as opposed to electric utilities). Thus the 8.9 million cap could actually be thought
of as a 14.5 million ton ceiling. Since the trading scheme allows industrial sources to opt-in and would,
therefore, provide them with allowances, it is important that the government both limits these sources'
emissions and takes their emissions into consideration when setting the cap. In this way, the opt-in provision
can increase the total number of allowances but not erode the emissions cap.
1991] 2711
The Yale Law Journal
fewer available to others. Not surprisingly, the Act reflects a concerted effort
by many special interest groups to secure a greater share of allowances.'
During Phase I, the Administrator is to allocate allowances based on the
product of each unit's baseline29 (essentially, its average past fuel consump-
tion) multiplied by an emissions rate of 2.50 pounds of SO 2 per mmBtu (lbs/-
mmBtu)20 Phase II employs a similar method to determine SO2 reductions.
However, for almost all the regulated sources, the emissions rate by which the
baseline is to be multiplied is reduced from 2.50 lbs/mmBtu to 1.20 lbs/mmBtu
to exact further reductions of SO2 emissions.3 Thus, the Amendment gives
existing polluters allowances based on how much fuel they have consumed, but
expects them to operate at a cleaner level during the next phase.
Calculating an allowance share in this manner is ingenious, for it is comput-
ed on the basis of a regulated source's past levels of production activity, rather
than on the basis of a source's past emissions tonnage. It would have been
simpler to allocate allowances according to the average of a source's past levels
of emissions and achieve the desired clean-up by requiring all existing polluters
to cut back either by a fixed amount or by a percentage of their emissions
levels. Unfortunately, this rule would have rewarded dirty sources with extra
allowances. 2 Some sources have already spent a significant amount of money
in reducing their emissions. Congress did not want to penalize companies that
had promptly obeyed pollution control laws in the past or to reward those that
had been slow to respond to previous pollution regulations.
Fortunately, the Amendment's distribution rule avoids this inequitable result
and still provides more productive plants with more allowances. 33 Affected
sources are divided into two categories: those with emissions rates above 1.2
lbs/mmBtu (dirty sources) and those with emissions rates below that level
28. For example, sections 404(a)(3) and 405(a)(3) award extra allowances to a few named utilities.
These provisions represent an obvious political concession to a strong lobbying group. Many provisions
were included not just in response to political pressure, but also to further legitimate social goals. For
example, section 404(f) encourages energy conservation and use of renewable energy sources.
29. The baseline for an affected unit is the annual average quantity of fossil fuel consumed by that
unit, measured in millions of British Thermal Units (mmBtu).
30. Telephone interview with Joe Goffman, supra note 25. The actual reduction requirements have
already been calculated and are listed in Table A of section 404.
31. §§ 405(a)-(c). Clean sources, those already operating with emission rates below 1.20 lbs per
mm/Btu, will receive allowances according to a slightly different formula set out in sections 405(d)-(e).
There are also provisions by which sources can elect to have their baselines assessed by a different calculus.
See § 404(h)(1)(C); § 405(i). Essentially, the scheme determines the total number of SO2 allowances by
calculating the average amount of fuel consumed by each regulated source and mandating a fixed reduction
in the levels of S02 emissions per measure of fuel used. One advantage to calculating the number of
allowances by assessing historic fuel consumption is that the available data is fairly accurate. Telephone
interview with Nancy Kete, Office of Policy Analysis and Review, EPA (November 9, 1989).
32. Hahn, supra note 2, at 98.
33. The Proposal's distribution rule does not reward polluters for having been slow to clean up their
emissions. For example, if two sources have been burning equal amounts of fuel in their production process,
they will receive exactly the same number of allowances. This is so even if the former has installed
scrubbers and has half the emissions of the latter. For a discussion of the equity concerns raised by different
distribution rules, see T. TIETENBERG, supra note 1, at 100-01, 110-13.
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(clean sources). After the year 1999, sources will be treated as though they are
operating at a 1.2 emissions rate. The result is that if one of these sources has
cut its emissions to a rate below 1.2, it will receive extra allowances. Clean
sources receive an additional quota of allowances. An expected increase of
120% in demand for electricity production is factored into their initial allow-
ance allocation.34
During Phases I and II, the Administrator will set aside additional reserves
of allowances, over and above those allocated through the distribution rules just
described. Congress targeted these reserves for different categories of sources,
primarily to secure necessary political support or to encourage the use of certain
reduction technologies. 35 Notably, the Amendment creates these allowance
pools without eroding the emissions cap. In the first place, most of these
reserves expire after 2009. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, section 403(a)(1)
requires the Administrator to reduce pro rata everyone's share of allowances
if the number scheduled for distribution would otherwise exceed the cap.36
Sections 404(a)(2) and 405(a)(2) create the largest reserves of allowanc-
es-called the Phase I and Phase II bonus reserves, respectively-by stealing
the reductions achieved during the calendar years 1995 and 2000 and translating
them into extra allowances. In practical terms, it is as if the Phase I and II
reductions were postponed for a year. The Phase I bonus reserve may not
exceed 3.5 million allowances.37 The Administrator will award these allowanc-
es to Phase I plants as incentives for using "qualifying phase I technology". 3
The Phase H bonus reserve sets aside up to 5.3 million allowances. 39 The
34. §§ 405(d)-(f).
35. See, e.g., §§ 405(b)(2), (b)(4), (c)(4), (d)(3)(A)-(B), (f)(2), (h)(2), (i), 406, 409, 416. Sec-
tions 405(b)(2), (c)(4) and (d)(3(A)-(B) provide bonus allowances to units whose baselines reflect production
activity well below the capacity of the unit; section 405(i) provides extra allowances to units in "high growth
states"; section 406 provides extra allowances for states with extremely low emissions rates.
36. The creation of these reserves does not even significantly disturbe the the Phase I and II reduction
schedules. The Amendment provides the bulk of the allowances for these reserves by robbing Peter to pay
Paul. For instance, the extra allowances granted to repowered sources under section 409 come out of each
utility's share of the total pool of allowances on a pro rata basis. § 405(a)(2). Similarly, section 416
establishes a reserve to accommodate both a government-supervised auction and a direct sale of allowances
at a fixed price. This provision directs the Administrator to withhold 2.8% of each year's allowances
beginning after the year 1995.
37. § 404(a)(2).
38. § 404(d). Qualifying Phase I technology is defined in section 402(19) and includes scrubbers. Sec-
tion 404(d)(1) allows any unit that commits to using the proper technology to meet its Phase I reduction
requirements to delay compliance until January 1, 1997. The unit receives allowances from the reserve pool
in an amount equal to its uncontrolled emissions above the Phase I limit. § 404(d)(5). This incentive allows
states whose economies are dependent on high sulfur coal mining to mandate or encourage the use of
scrubbers or other technology in lieu of switching to low sulfur coal to meet reduction requirements. While
subsidizing the use of scrubbers might increase the cost of pollution control at the expense of the taxpayers,
a sudden conversion away from high sulfur coal would result in massive unemployment in certain regions.
Similarly, while the methods encouraged by § 404(f)(2) (incentives to use conservation and renewable energy
sources) could prove more expensive, they help achieve other policy goals. For a more detailed treatment
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Administrator will distribute 530,000 annually during Phase II to accommodate
various political agendas as mandated by the Amendment. 4
Once Congress has determined the number of allowances and their recipi-
ents, it must decide how the Administrator will transfer the allowances to
affected sources. The Amendment "grandfathers" the majority of the allowanc-
es, which is to say the government gives existing polluters free emissions rights
based on the distribution rule explained earlier. Thereafter, it leaves the task
of redistribution to the private market. The Amendment also employs a zero-
revenue auction to distribute a small portion of the allowances and a zero-




Distributing allowances by auctioning them off is unpopular with industry
because it requires sources to pay for allowances to pollute as well as for
pollution control. Zero-revenue auctions are more politically palatable than
regular auctions because they redistribute the revenues from the sale back to
the polluters.42 Sources pay for any allowances over and above what they
would have received under the initial distribution rule, and they are reimbursed
for all allowances they would have received but did not purchase4 3 This
method of initial allocation also ensures efficiency, since polluters should not
purchase more allowances than they need.
The Amendment utilizes the zero-revenue auction concept in a limited
fashion. It requires the Administrator to auction 150,000 allowances annually
during Phase H and 250,000 allowances each year thereafter.4' The Adminis-
trator then redistributes the funds collected from these auctions to the owners
or operators of affected sources on a pro-rata basis.45
40. §§ 405(b)(2), (c)(4), (d)(3)(A)-(B), (h)(2), 406. For a brief description of the goals of some of these
provisions see supra note 35.
41. § 416. The zero-revenue auction will be discussed in the following section. The direct sale is
organized in section 416(c). Each year beginning in the year 2000, the Administrator will offer 50,000
allowances for sale at $1,500 each (adjusted by the Consumer Price Index). These allowances will be sold
on a first-come, first-served basis with priority given to new, independent power producers. §§ 416(c)(1)
& (2). The proceeds from these sales will be returned, on a pro rata basis, to those from whom the
allowances for this reserve were withheld. At first blush, the provision for the direct sale of allowances might
seem to threaten the market's pricing mechanism. See infra Part IV.B. However, the consensus concerning
this provision is that the fixed price is so high that it will operate as neither a ceiling nor a floor for the
market price. EPA's modeling showed expected allowance prices to be less than $800 per ton. Senate
Report, supra note 9, at 326.
42. T. TIETMNBERG, supra note I, at 101; Hahn & Noll, supra note 11, at 141.
43. Hahn & Noll, supra note 5, at 75-76; Hahn & Noll, supra note 11, at 141.
44. § 416(d)(1).
45. § 416(d)(3). The Administrator also has discretion to discontinue the zero-revenue auctions in the
event of sustained lack of participation. § 416(0. Congress would have been better advised to have allowed
the Administrator to terminate the auctions whenever she became satisfied that the threat of hoarding had
ended, with the option to renew the auctions if hoarding behavior were to reappear.
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The Amendment's zero-revenue auction design has one troubling feature.
Any source may avail itself of the government-run auction to sell its allowanc-
es. 6 This option saves private industry the transactions costs of seeking trad-
ing partners. But the Amendment prohibits the government from charging the
traders a process fee to cover the costs of running the auction. 7 Providing a
free auction service discourages the private sector from taking over this task.
However, Congress has given EPA a choice: The Administrator may "provide
for the conduct of sales or auctions under the Administrator's supervision by
other departments or agencies of the United States Government or by nongov-
ernmental agencies, groups, or organizations."48 EPA should immediately
delegate this responsibility to the private sector, which could pass on to the
participants any administrative costs.
III. EXCHANGE METHODS
A system's "exchange method" has serious consequences for the level of
efficiency and the degree of equity the market achieves. In this Note, the term
"exchange method" denotes the manner by which allowances exchange hands.
Participants may exchange allowances through either standard or auction sales.
Standard sales are the result of bilateral negotiations between polluters, in which
the government acts only as a regulator. Auction sales occur during an auction.
Both markets in which the initial allocation is administered by grand-
fathering allowances and markets in which auctions serve only to distribute the
initial allowance allocation (single-auction schemes) rely almost exclusively on
standard sales to transfer allowances. Once the initial distribution of allowances
has either been given away or auctioned off, standard sales alone maintain the
efficiency of the allocation. Auction markets49 are different; their periodic
feature forces continual active trading and makes standard sales expendable.
Thus auction markets are more efficient. To explain why this is so, this Part
momentarily diverts our attention from the specific legislation to explain how
auction markets generally: 1) overcome psychological barriers against trading,
where trading poses unknown risks and costs, 2) exact lower transactions costs,
3) yield better enforcement mechanisms, and 4) oblige polluters to compensate
society for the costs imposed upon it by their polluting activities.
46. § 416(d)(4).
47. § 416(d)(3)(A).
48. § 416(f) (emphasis added).
49. Many variations on the concept of an auction are imaginable. Auctions can be government-
sponsored or privately run. Moreover, a trading scheme can use an auction solely for the initial transfer of
allowances from the government to the participants or periodically to maintain an efficient distribution. In
this Note, unless otherwise specified, "auction market" (or "auction scheme" or "auction system") refers
to a market system which relies on periodic, government-run auctions both to distribute the initial allocation
and periodically to redistribute the allowances.
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A. Exchange Methods and Efficiency
1. The Problem of Hoarding
Auction markets increase participation of regulated sources by requiring all
sources either to purchase allowances or cease operations. Grandfathering
systems raise efficiency concerns because they allow all trading to take place
through standard sales, enabling polluters to hoard allowances. Hoarding will
occur if participants fear the market will fail to provide them with allowances
in the future. These sources bank their excess allowances as a type of insurance.
Not every source which banks its allowances qualifies as a hoarder. Hoarding
occurs when it is actually in the economic interest of allowance holders to sell,
but they still refuse to do so.
Were participants certain to act rationally and with perfect information, they
would trade whenever they stood to benefit from doing so, and the same final
allowance allocation would result under a grandfathering as under an auction
scheme (assuming no transactions costs). Unfortunately, buyers and sellers do
not always operate rationally and under conditions of perfect information.
Experience with past trading systems indicates that polluters have sometimes
foresaken the market even when, as realized in hindsight, it would have been
in their economic interest to have traded.50 One problem is that the potential
sellers lack the requisite information to ascertain the point at which it would
be in their economic interest to sell.
A reluctance to sell something out of a belief that future scarcity will
dramatically increase its value is a normal market phenomenon. Such withhold-
ing merely drives the price up to the point where the possessor is willing to
sell. However, to the extent that traders overestimate the impact of future
reduction requirements and future growth needs and underestimate the benefits
of future technology, the price of allowances will unnecessarily raise the overall
cost of pollution control.51 Such a result frustrates the very purpose for intro-
50. See T. TIETENBERG, supra note 1, at 11 (claiming that industry may have been reticent to use
markets in past because it feared assuming unknown risks).
51. Representatives of regulated sources have emphatically asserted their intention to withhold
allowances from the market. They claim that uncertainty caused by a lack of information about future
allowance needs will prevent them from ever reaching a rational decision as to the value of their excess
allowances. See House Hearings pt. 2, supra note 2, at 380-81, 383 (statement of A. Joseph Dowd, Senior
Vice President and General Counsel, American Electric Power Service Corp.); id. at 300, 304 (statement
of William Berry, chairman, Virginia Power); id. at 388, 390 (statement of David Penn, general manager,
Wisconsin Public Power Inc. on behalf of American Public Power Association); Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1989: Hearings on Acid Rain Before the Subcomm. on Environmental Protection of the Senate Comm.
on Environment and Public Vorks, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 5 198, 309-10 (1989) [hereinafter Senate
Hearingspt. 5] (statement of villiam A. Badger, representative of National Association of Regulatory Utility
Commissioners) (These hearings fccus on an earlier draft of the Amendment, but the cited portions are
equally relevant to the enacted Amendment.). But see House Hearings pt. 2 supra note 2 at 220-21
(testimony of Richard Schmalensee, member, CEA) ("[T]here may... be an incentive for some parties
to project a response to the market that they will not wish to carry out once the market is established.")
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ducing a market system: to achieve maximum pollution control at minimum
cost.
Market participants who are extremely risk averse will be less likely to
hoard if the government (or a private business) periodically auctions off the
allowances. This consequence might not seem obvious. Presumably, just as
these participants would refuse to sell at a reasonable price, they would spend
excessive amounts at an auction to purchase extra allowances. Thus, the same
hoarding behavior should appear during an auction. However, crucial differenc-
es exist. First, it may be easier for people to forego opportunity costs than
actively to incur those same costs. Thus, while a polluter might be willing to
forego the payment of $X in order to retain an extra allowance, it might not
be willing to pay $X for an extra allowance. 52
Second, the structure of a grandfathering system confers an unfair advantage
on hoarders by giving them absolute price setting power. If an owner places
an infinite (or excessive) value on its allowances, a buyer can offer no reason-
able amount of money to induce the owner to sell. The mechanics of the
grandfathering system leave the buyer powerless to change the behavior of the
hoarder. During an auction, conversely, every participant starts off on an even
playing field. Even those placing an infinite value on allowances will be forced
to name a finite price. Their bids will be constrained practically by their
economic resources. The absence of this constraint in conjunction with the
psychological attachment to ownership militates against granting the present
holders of allowances an indefinite right of ownership.53
A final advantage of an auction scheme lies in its ability to foster consumer
confidence in the market. Since the allowances expire after a certain period of
time and are re-auctioned, future availability is guaranteed. This assurance
should give potential sellers greater confidence that they will be able to buy
back the allowances they contemplate selling.
If owners of allowances refuse to sell at any reasonable price, the market
will suffer. New sources will be unable to enter the market.54 Additionally,
the inefficiency produced by the present allocation of allowances will persist.
A grandfathering system of the kind proposed mandates identical reduction
percentages across the board, without factoring in any cost considerations
whatsoever. Artificially inflated prices could greatly reduce the benefits of a
market scheme. As a practical matter it is unclear the extent to which sources
52. Thaler, Illusions and Mirages in Public Policy, 73 PUB. INTEREST 60,63-64 (1982) ("The endow-
ment effect stipulates that an individual will demand much more money to give something up than he would
pay to acquire it." Id. at 64).
53. The fact that many regulated sources are public utilities, overseen by state administrative agencies,
may also ease any tendency to hoard. Agency scrutiny may provide a forum for exposing irrational behavior.
See House Hearings pt. 2, supra note 2, at 221-22 (testimony of Richard Schmalensee, member, CEA).
54. See H.R. REP. No. 490, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 366-67 (1990) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT]
(This report discusses an earlier draft of the Amendment, but the cited portions are equally relevant to the
enacted Amendment.).
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would forgo the opportunity costs that the potential sale of their allowances
presents. Nevertheless, to the extent that irrational motivations influence the
decisions of participants, an auction market provides the most efficient system.
2. Transactions Costs-Identifying Buyers and Sellers
An auction market will exact lower transactions costs and therefore will cost
polluters less than a market system that relies exclusively or primarily on
standard sales, even given robust participation under both schemes. One factor
which will affect transactions costs is the ease with which buyers and sellers
are able to locate each other and negotiate a trade. These activities can be
expensive. In past trading systems, individual buyers have spent thousands of
dollars to locate an appropriate trading partner and execute a standard sale.55
Of course, a service might develop to provide potential traders with infor-
mation. This service would lower transactions costs, but not reduce them as
much as auctions would. Auctions, by nature, bring together buyers and sellers.
Furthermore, they provide immediate price information, at least about the sale
at hand. Finally, they ensure that the bilateral negotiations during the initial
trade take place within a circumscribed period of time. As a result, negotiations
cannot become protracted and unnecessarily costly. Auction sales thus provide
a less expensive way to achieve and maintain the optimum allowance allocation.
3. Enforcement
Auction markets can produce greater efficiency by eliminating the incentive
to hoard and by decreasing the transactions costs of locating trading partners
and negotiating trades. They can also be structured to improve efficiency
indirectly by encouraging enforcement. Auctions charge polluters for their
allowances. Professors Bruce Ackerman and Richard Stewart have observed
that if EPA's budget were derived from the revenue generated by selling
allowances, the agency would have a keener desire to insure compliance. 56
Were the agency lax in enforcement, the allowance price would drop signifi-
cantly. Few polluters would pay for the right to pollute if they could pollute
with impunity without buying that right. Therefore, if the agency wanted to
maintain its revenue flow, it would have to enforce permit conditions.
55. Hahn & Hester, supra note 1, at 122 n.74.
56. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 3, at 183.
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B. Exchange Methods and Equity Concerns-Reimbursing Society Versus
Subsidizing Polluters
Auction markets offer more than increased efficiency; they are also more
equitable. The creation of pollution rights explicitly recognizes that polluting
imposes a cost on society, and thus raises the question of who shall bear that
cost. The decision as to whether the polluter should pay to pollute through an
auction system, or whether society should absorb the cost through a grand-
fathering scheme, influences the equitable and political appeal of these systems.
Determining who should bear the cost of polluting does not significantly
affect the total expense of pollution control imposed by the regulatory scheme.
In both the grandfathering and zero-revenue auction schemes, the government
gives allowances to polluters, so polluters pay only to reduce emissions or to
purchase allowances in order to avoid making further reductions.57 That is,
they pay only the cost of pollution control. Polluters participating in auction
markets, on the other hand, must pay an additional sum to purchase allowances
from the gove;nment. This extra cost translates into a payment for the privilege
of making legal emissions. It requires the polluter to pay society for suffering
the harm of its polluting activities.
In deciding whether to charge polluters a fee to pollute, much will depend
upon the societal perspective on the fairness of this approach. Thomas Tieten-
berg, in his book, Emissions Trading: An Exercise in Reforming Pollution
Policy, maintains that fairness, as well as political considerations, dictate using
a grandfathering or zero-revenue distribution method.58 He classifies auctions,
grandfathering methods, and zero-revenue auctions according to the resulting
financial transfers-to either the government or other sources. He claims that
auction markets result in transfers from industry to the government,5 9 while
grandfathering and zero-revenue schemes only produce transfers among sourc-
es.10 Tietenberg assumes that under the present command and control system
there is no financial transfer.6" The unstated and incorrect premise of his
analysis is that since polluters have enjoyed a free right to pollute, they are
entitled to continue to do so; that they, in a sense, own pollution rights. There-
57. A grandfathering system should result in slightly higher total pollution control expenses, but only
because of the additional transactions costs surrounding standard sales. Note that under a grandfathering
scheme the distribution rule governs the financial burden of pollution control borne by individual sources
(though not by the entire regulated industry), by determining which sources will be buyers and which will
be sellers. T. TMTENBERG, supra note 1, at 101.
58. Id. at 102.
59. Id. at 99; see also Hahn & Noll, supra note 5, at 74.
60. In a market system which gives permits away, the transfer of money is between affected sources.
Sources with higher marginal abatement costs purchase a greater number of permits, transferring money
to affected sources with lower marginal abatement costs. Of course, even the sources which transfer money
to others end up with lower pollution abatement expenditures.
61. T. TIETENBERG, supra note 1, at 97-102.
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fore, when the government forces them to pay for rights that they already own,
there is a transfer from industry to the government.
An arguably more accurate characterization would identify society, not
polluters, as the primary "owners" of clean air or air rights. Given this contrast-
ing assumption, fee structures that charge polluters to pollute are better under-
stood as facilitating simple transactions between buyers (the polluters) and
sellers (society as a whole). The polluters are purchasing society's right to enjoy
unpolluted air. Historically, industry has been "purchasing" and society has
been "selling" rights to pollute the air at the very undervalued (or inefficient)
price of zero. Under the auction system, society would finally establish a
market price for this commodity. Industry's payment for allowances would
compensate society for its loss of clean air. Conversely, under "give-away"
systems like the Amendment, the status-quo financial transfer from society to
industry continues unchallenged. This analysis recognizes "give-away" pro-
grams for what they are: a subsidy by society to existing polluters.
Society however may wish to subsidize existing polluters.62 Fear of indus-
try shut-down and the accompanying loss of jobs, as well as the distributional
effects of higher prices for goods produced by regulated industries, are valid
concerns.
C. Congress' Choice
It is curious that Congress has opted to grandfather allowances, given the
reasons in favor of an auction market. To review: auction markets exact lower
transactions costs by reducing the number of costly bilateral negotiations.
Furthermore, they oblige polluters to obtain allowances by using the market
mechanism, so participants are more likely to overcome psychological barriers
against trading, even where trading poses unknown risks and costs. In addition,
auction systems may provide institutional incentives that should encourage EPA
to enforce pollution regulations. Most importantly, auction markets oblige
polluters to compensate society for the costs imposed upon it by their polluting
activities. It would seem, then, that an auction system provides a slightly more
efficient and thoroughly more equitable market system than the Amendment's.
However, the Amendment's system has one great advantage over an auction
scheme: its political appeal to influential interest groups. The Amendment
provides regulated industries with valuable allowances, which they can trade
for money. It also pleases environmentalists by realizing a significant reduction
in pollution. The only parties that stand to lose from this scheme are prospec-
tive sources, who will not receive free allowances. In order to enter the market,
they will have to purchase allowances, even though there is no guarantee that
62. For a comprehensive analysis of the indirect effects of placing the burden of paying for the harmful
effects of polluting on industry, see T. TIETENBERG, supra note 1.
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an adequate supply at a competitive price will be available." But these sourc-
es, being prospective, did not exist during the passage of the Amendment.
Therefore, they exerted no pressure on legislators. For these reasons, the
Amendment had a better chance of passage without an auction scheme."
IV. THE GENERATION OF AN ACTIVE MARKET
Despite the shortcomings of its exchange method, Congress' trading scheme
will very likely generate a healthy market. It might be a less equitable and
slightly more expensive scheme, but, as this Part shows, there are ways to
compensate for many of the efficency shortcomings of grandfathering schemes
pointed out in the previous discussion. Of course, numerous variables must
coalesce before a grandfathering system will produce a viable market. There
must be a proper composition of active participants to support it.65 This re-
quires not only an adequately large pool of traders, varied enough in their need
for allowances to insure that some will buy and some will sell,66 but also a
willingness on their part to use the system. Additionally, the allowances must
be readily available and must retain their economic value. All of these variables
can operate in a mutually supportive manner.6 However, it is also true that
any one variable might operate to discourage potential market activity. This Part
discusses how well the Amendment's scheme meets the conditions for generat-
ing and sustaining a market to control acid deposition.
Since this Note assumes that the Amendment's market has the proper
composition of regulated sources, the first focus will be on the participants'
willingness to use the system. Two main factors will influence the willingness
of potential traders to patronize the market. First, there must be an incentive
to trade. Second, transactions costs must be sufficiently low to maintain this
incentive.6" In other words, unless polluters perceive the gains from trading to
be greater than its costs, no market will evolve.69
63. Section 416 insures a supply of allowances for new sources, but at double the price. See supra note
41.
64. A zero-revenue auction scheme might have provided a second-best alternative, by securing the
efficiencies of an auction system. Furthermore, zero-revenue auction and grandfathering schemes have equal
political appeal. They both make society, not the polluter, pay for the harmful effects of polluting. See Hahn
& Noll, supra note 5, at 75-76. Unfortunately, zero-revenue auctions place greater administrative burdens
on the government and bring in no revenue in return. It is therefore fortuitous that the Amendment
contemplates auctioning only a small fraction of the total pool of allowances in this manner.
65. Hahn & Noll, supra note 5, at 66.
66. Tripp & Dudek, supra note 4, at 376.
67. Some markets with grandfathered pollution rights have been successful. See Hahn, supra note 2,
at 101-03 (discussing success of EPA's lead trading program); cf. Tripp & Dudek, supra note 4, at 382-84
(anticipating success of new market system designed by EPA to reduce chlorofluorocarbon production).
68. See Hahn & Hester, supra note 1, at 140-41. See generally Roberts, supra note 5, at 104-06
(discussing incompatibility of lowering transaction costs and maintaining strict oversight of polluters).
69. Furthermore, no small group of buyers or sellers should control a sufficiently large portion of the
supply or demand as to give them market power. See T. TIETENBERG, supra note I, at 125-49; Hahn & Noll,
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A. The Incentive to Trade
Participants must perceive a potential to profit from trading allowances. The
Amendment primarily uses a grandfathering system. Thus initial trading will
occur only if the abatement costs for the different sources vary enough that the
primary distribution of allowances is so inefficient as to insure that the gains
from trading will be greater than the costs. Costs of trading include both the
price of the allowances, which should reflect the risk of future unavailability,
and the transactions costs which necessarily surround the sale. Obviously, the
probability of large gains from single trades will be greater where the initial
distribution is enormously inefficient, and the transactions costs surrounding
the trades are low. A corollary observation is that perhaps no trading will take
place if the initial allocation of allowances is not adequately inefficient.
The potential market participants of this system appear to face significant
differences in abatement costs. Larger plants, for example, can exploit econo-
mies of scale in pollution reduction and sell their allowances to smaller sources
with higher abatement costs. Because the government will initially auction off
a certain number of allowances, the first allowance distribution will not be as
inefficient as under a straight grandfathering method. However, given the small
number of allowances that will be auctioned and the positive incentives to trade
that introducing the partial auction will provide, it is unlikely that this auction
will substantially impair the Amendment's emissions market. To the contrary,
the auction component was introduced into the scheme as "an attempt to 'jump
start"' allowance trading, "should it not evolve organically."70
B. Transactions Costs
The lower the transactions costs, the greater the gains from trading. The
following features foster lower transactions costs: a process for buyers and
sellers easily to identify each other;71 current market price information that
is readily available and accurate enough to be used by buyers in their cost-
supra note 11, at 134-37; Hahn & Noll, supra note 5, at 75 & n.37. Although this is a major concern
relevant to the success of a market, it is so unlikely to be a problem in this situation that this Note will forgo
discussion of it. Auctions have the additional advantage in that they reduce the probability that any one
source will control a sufficient percentage of the supply or demand to exercise market power. Hahn & Noll,
supra note 11, at 134-45. For a brief outline of why the Amendments market scheme should easily escape
this problem, see House Hearings pt. 2, supra note 2, at 223, 228 (Testimony of Richard Schmalensee,
member, CEA); see also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 54, at 366 ("[Tlhere seems to be little or no positive
reason for.., a utility or group of utilities to hold on to allowances to drive the price up in order to comer
the market or gain competitive advantage and, of course, there are obvious legal reasons not to do so.").
The concentration of allowances is a factor. A greater risk of collusive behavior arises if too many
allowances are concentrated in the hands of a small number of participants. With respect to both the utility
holding companies and the different states, concentration will be sufficiently low. House Hearings pt. 2,
supra note 2, at 218-19 (Testimony of Richard Schmalensee, member, CEA).
70. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 54, at 366.
71. Hahn & Hester, supra note 1, at 140-41.
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benefit analyses; and streamlined rules common from state to state governing
trading procedures.
As indicated earlier, the auction system best facilitates buyers' and sellers'
searches for each other. However, under this scheme, most sales will not be
by auction. Fortunately, two factors unique to acid deposition control regulation
should help bring together buyers and sellers. First, the bill primarily targets
large electric utility plants, of which there are a relatively small number nation-
wide. Phase I regulates only 111 plants. Phase II includes many smaller plants
bringing the total number of regulated sources to approximately 2,054. The
singularity of the regulated industry and the limited number of regulated sources
should lower the transactions costs of standard sales by simplifying searches
for transaction partners.
The second practical aid to potential traders is the existence of contractual
relationships among many groups of independent electric utilities to insure that
each has a readily available, emergency supply of power. These "power-pool-
ing" arrangements provide many members of the regulated industry with a
regular flow of information about the practices and costs of the other sources
in the pool.72 Given these factors and the possibility of establishing an infor-
mation clearinghouse (discussed infra), the transactions costs involved in
locating trading partners might be reduced to a minimum.
Another influence on transactions costs is a system's ability to provide an
indication of the current market price of allowances in the event of meager
early trading.73 Potential market. users must perform a cost-benefit analysis
to determine the economic benefits of trading. Unless the polluters can forecast,
at least approximately, the costs of requisite allowances, they will not know
whether to use the market. Thus, the failure of a system to produce a reliable
indicator of market price will lead to a downward spiral in the use of the
market.
An auction scheme would be less dependent upon the emergence of a
reliable market price.74 All necessary trading could take place during the auc-
tion, eliminating the need for prior knowledge of market price. The proposed
scheme however will require robust standard trading to provide an accurate
indication of current market price. Two economists have warned that "[i]nfre-
quent trades would produce infrequent and possibly highly variable price signals
that undermine the ability of polluters to make efficient choices of levels and
methods of abatement." 75
72. See Senate Hearingspt. 5, supra note 51, at 285-91 (letter to Sen. Baucus by Daniel Dudek, Senior
Economist, Environmental Defense Fund).
73. Hahn & Noll, supra note 11, at 137-42.
74. Auctions should also "maximize[] the amount of information conveyed by the initial price signal,"
by allowing the price to be set by all participants, not simply those who received an inefficient initial
allocation. Hahn & Noll, supra note 15, at 141-42.
75. Id. at 121.
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The Amendment's combination of auction and standard sales could either
inhibit or aid the development of a price indicator. One can assume that some
trading will occur in the zero-revenue auction market, so that the auction
component will be likely to provide market price information. Of course, the
price that will emerge will not reflect the transactions costs of a market which
relies primarily on standard sales. How great a difference this omission will
make will depend on the organization of the market which subsequently arises,
and on the magnitude of the transactions costs it exacts.
On the down side, to the extent that trading in the zero-revenue auction
reduces trades of the standard variety, the partial auction system may fare even
worse than a pure grandfathering system in providing a reliable price indicator
for the market. If post-auction trading is very light, the post-auction price may
never stop fluctuating.7 6 However, the allowances scheduled to be traded
through these auctions comprise a very small percentage of the total pool, so
the auction's effect on the market should be slight.
Fortunately, transactions costs can be lowered by means other than recent
active trading. A private organization could establish an information clearing-
house similar to the option market quotation system. Participants would list the
number and price of the allowances they wanted to sell.77 This system would
help participants identify willing buyers and sellers, and the price quotations
would serve buyers in making their cost-benefit analyses. Alternatively, a
privately run, periodic auction service could perform this function. Such a
service would probably develop were the Administrator to turn over responsibil-
ity for the annual auction of the special reserve to the private sector.
A third factor influencing transactions costs is the simplicity of the trading
process.78 For instance, were each trade to require extensive paper work and
approval through numerous bureaucratic channels, the transactions costs would
escalate accordingly. Fortunately, in the case of acid deposition control, exten-
sive oversight or complex procedures are unnecessary.79 The permits held by
sources are like accounts held with EPA. When allowances are distributed, the
76. Hahn and Noll note a similar problem where the first distribution of allowances is based on a
projected equilibrium of a smoothly functioning market:
To the extent that the initial distribution [were to] succeed[] in finding the competitive equilibrium,
it would also succeed in avoiding the necessity for any transactions among present sources....
Thus, a relatively speedy attainment of a stable, competitive price for permits would be least likely
under this mechanism.
Id. at 138.
77. If at all possible, market forces and not the government should establish this clearinghouse.
Government intervention should only help establish the market, assuming that no private entity was
interested and should relinquish the task to the private market as soon as private forces would take over.
78. See Tripp & Dudek, supra note 4, at 376-77.
79. Because SO2 emissions travel in the air channels over long distances and tend to end up in the same
areas, even if they originate hundreds of miles apart, there is no need to examine each trade to insure that
the polluters do not cluster in too small a region, thereby creating "hot spots". See House Hearings pt. 2,
supra note 2, at 217-18 (testimony of Richard Schmalensee, member, CEA); id. at 18-19 (testimony of
William K. Reilly, Administrator, EPA).
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accounts are credited. When a trade is made, the buyer's account is credited
and the seller's account is debited by the amount of the trade. When a source's
CEMS is read, the amount on the reading is checked against its account. The
system is no more complicated than a standard checking account."0
C. Insuring a Supply of Allowances
Even with enough allowances to go around, the supply will disappear if
hoarding becomes a problem or if sources collusively withhold allowances from
potential competitors. The organization of this market makes such problems
unlikely.
The trading region of this system covers the entire United States, while the
competition of the regulated industry is usually at a local level, so it is unlikely
that participants can ever manipulate this market to erect a barrier to competi-
tion. A new independent power producer should easily be able to find a seller
located in a different area of the country. Alternatively, the annual auction will
provide the necessary allowances. If all else fails, the newcomer can avail itself
of the direct sale of allowances, even if it means paying an inflated price.
The zero-revenue auction component should combat the participants' desire
to hoard their allowances. This provision insures the availability of allowances
on the market at fixed intervals. As a result, sources that might otherwise be
reticent to sell their excess allowances, for fear that they might be unable to
meet future growth needs," will probably opt to trade. 2 Alternatively, sourc-
es concerned about ensuring themselves a future allowance supply might lease
their allowances. Leasing should work especially well in the next few years as
there are a number of older, dirtier plants, close to retirement that might prefer
to lease allowances for the duration of their life span. This would allow the
sources in states with high projected growth needs, in effect, to "hoard" their
allowances while still keeping them available to the market.
D. The Economic Value of the Allowances
In order for allowances to retain their value, the Administrator must not
flood the market with them and must enforce the rules of the market. The
emissions cap, so well protected in this bill, prevents the former threat. Without
an inflexible commitment to an emissions cap, a marketable permit scheme
would never work effectively. The Administration would face constant political
80. Telephone interview with Joe Goffman, supra note 25. See also supra note 23.
81. Concern over future growth needs surfaces throughout the debates over earlier versions of this
Amendment. See generally House Hearings pt. 2, supra note 2; Senate Hearings pt. 5, supra note 51.
82. The zero-revenue auction component could have allowed the Administrator to increase the
percentage of allowances to be auctioned should hoarding become a serious problem. Unfortunately, the
Amendment expressly limits the number of allowances that may be auctioned. § 416(d)(1). This inflexibility
strips EPA of its ability to experiment with the auction provision as an anti-hoarding device.
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pressure to increase the number of allowances and give various sources special
treatment in the form of extra allowances.
An auction system could have provided a better enforcement mechanism,
as discussed in Part III.A.3. Still, the Amendment requires that every source
participating in the market install a CEMS. Even substitute and voluntary
sources will operate CEMS's. Verifying compliance with emissions limitations
will therefore be much simpler and more likely to occur.
V. CONCLUSION
The Amendment's market scheme is praiseworthy. It includes a zealously
guarded emissions cap, a bureaucratically simple trading process, adequate
incentives to encourage active trading, and a manageable method by which to
ascertain compliance. The major weaknesses of its exchange method (increased
risk of hoarding and increased transactions costs) can be or have been mitigated
by, among other things, the auction provision and the clearinghouse option. The
decision to give away the allowances is the product of political compromise.
While critics may object to the decision, it does not represent a structural flaw
in the market. The equitable nature of a market scheme does not affect its
vitality.
The challenge of controlling acid deposition provides an excellent opportu-
nity to experiment with market schemes to control pollution. Implementing the
Amendment will provide experience in establishing such a market system. The
government should study its virtues and deficiencies in order to devise even
better trading systems to control other forms of pollution. Unfortunately, there
is no guarantee that any pollution control bill, no matter how sound, will solve
our country's problem with acid deposition. Because a system will only be as
effective as the people who command it, no mechanism will insure a perfect
outcome. And even a poorly structured scheme will work well if a strong
political will supports its goals. Since the Amendment, like any regulatory
program, can be destroyed by inadequate execution, one can only hope that the
executive branch's enthusiasm for marketable permit schemes will endure until
our nation's problem of acid deposition is well under control.
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